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TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
Volume 44 Winter 1977 Number 2
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: DEAN WADE AND
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION
402A
REED DICKERSON*
I. THE ISSUE
In his contribution to the products liability symposium in
honor of Professor Dix Noel' several years ago, Dean John Wade
made an important contribution to the burgeoning law of prod-
ucts liability by addressing himself to an important issue that
most authorities, judicial or academic, have ignored or swept
under the rug as academic trivia:2 whether the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, section 402A is compatible with statutory sales
law.2 For them, the issue, if it ever existed in any significant
sense, is a fading vignette of legal history; section 402A "has now
swept the field."4
Wade, on the other hand, performed a valuable service to
American constitutional law by recognizing in print (1) that the
judicial adoption of section 402A has been valid only if and to the
extent that the area it occupies was not inconsistently occupied
or preempted by the Uniform Sales Act or its more widely
adopted successor, the Uniform Commercial Code, (2) that the
possibility of a significant inconsistency between section 402A
and the Code raises a constitutional issue of legislative suprem-
acy that even chronic judicial disregard cannot erase, and (3) that
* A.B., Williams College; LL.B., Harvard University; LL.M., J.S.D., Col-
umbia University; Professor of Law, Indiana University; Chairman, Indiana
Commission on Uniform State Laws.
1. 42 TENN. L. REv. 1-186 (1974).
2. See, e.g., Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 110 N.H. 36, 38, 260
A.2d 111, 112 (1969).
3. Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted
by the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REv. 123 (1974). But
the sweep is not complete. See, e.g., Wilhelm v. Globe Solvent Co., 873 A.2d
218, 222 (Del. Super Ct. 1977).
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the courts have a professional, indeed constitutional, responsibil-
ity to interpret the Code to determine whether, and if so to what
extent, it occupies or preempts the field of products liability.5
After noting that the courts have avoided discussion of this issue
even though they apply section 402A, Wade concludes that it is
now time "to face up to the problem."' He then proceeds to do
so. But how successfully?
Having been too heavily committed to other projects to par-
ticipate in the Noel symposium or even to follow through with a
delayed entry, I hope I may be allowed to stir the embers one
more time. There are lessons here that may be valuable even
apart from any meager hope of salvaging rationality in the field
of products liability.
My disaffection with section 402A, which goes back to the
1961 American Law Institute debates7 and which is shared by
others," has been documented often. My general complaint is
that section 402A has been either unnecessary, if it did not under-
cut the Uniform Sales Act or the Code, or unconstitutional, if it
did. In either case, the motivation for section 402A was to make
sure that a broad area of products liability was free of any un-
pleasant tentacles of statutory sales law.'0 As a result of the sec-
tion's success, the Code has become almost irrelevant in this area
and, within a few years, it may cease even to be mentioned.
5. Id. at 125.
6. Id.
7. See 38 ALI PROCEDINGS 76-79 (1961).
8. See S. WADDAMS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 221 (1974); Franklin, When
Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases,
18 STAN. L. REv. 974 (1966); Miller, The Crossroads: The Case for the Code in
Products Liability, 21 OKLA. L. Rv. 411 (1968); Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of
Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on Juris-
prudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication Barriers, 17 W. REs. L.
REV. 6 (1965); Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713 (1970). See also Donnelly, After
the Fall of the Citadel: Exploitation of the Victory or Consideration of All
Interests?, 19 SYRAcusE L. REV. 1 (1967).
9. See Dickerson, The Basis of Strict Products Liability, 16 Foon DRUG
COSM. L.J. 585 (1961), reprinted in 17 Bus. LAW. 157 (1961) and 1962 INs. L.J.
7; Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability-With a Close Look at Section
402A and the Code, 36 TENN. L. REv. 439 (1969); Dickerson, Was Prosser's Folly
Also Traynor's? Or Should the Judges Monument be Moved to a Firmer Site?,
2 HOFSTRA L. REv. 469 (1974).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, Comment m (1965).
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But even a judicial and academic fait accompli is no warrant
for abandoning the matter. No statute of limitations runs on
unconstitutionality, and American law is worth protecting
against the danger that section 402A (and more recently section
402B) will inspire similar conceptual misadventures in analogous
situations such as those involved in defective housing. 1 Metas-
tasis is a continuing risk and probably a greater danger than the
original disease.
For latecomers, here are some specifics. The Uniform Sales
Act and its successor, the Uniform Commercial Code, were en-
acted with language that raised serious questions as to whether a
consumer could recover from a seller for injuries caused by a
defective product in cases in which there was a lack of privity, a
seller's disclaimer, or a lack of timely notice by the consumer. To
assure consumer relief free of such statutory limitations, the
American Law Institute included in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts the well-known section 402A,' 2 which, being wrapped in the
11. In the recently promulgated Uniform Land Transactions Act, a strong
effort was made by its authors to include a section, inspired by section 402A and
the cases adopting it, that would have in effect invited the courts to derogate
from the very warranty provisions relating to consequential damages that the
authors of the Act had so painstakingly worked out. Attacked as a "suicide"
provision, the proposed section was, fortunately, stricken. It read as follows:
Nothing in this Act determines or affects the liability or non-
liability in tort of a seller to any person, including the buyer, arising
apart from this Act for injury to the person, death, property damage,
or other loss caused by a condition of the real estate [section 2-3141.
Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws
157-293 (1975).
12. RESTATEMENT (SFCOND) oF ToRTs § 402A (1965) states:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer.
(1) One who sells any produ6t in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property, is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
19771
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clothes of pure tort, hardly looked like a possible threat to the
Code. Even so, the section has been occasionally attacked as an
unseemly, even unconstitutional, intrusion upon the Code. But
until Wade, the academic and judicial response had been largely
one of benign neglect.
The crucial constitutional assumption is that the principle of
legislative supremacy, which inheres in the separation of powers
found in every state constitution, means that once the legislature
has constitutionally spoken, the courts are bound to respect the
objectively ascertained meaning of that utterance, including its
implications-" Briefly, a court may not repeal or amend a statute.
That the power to make law is not the exclusive province of the
legislature, or that the separation of powers is complicated, does
not dilute the basic principle, which Wade's defense of section
402A concedes.
Accordingly, the basic issues are these: Do the warranty,
disclaimer, or notice provisions of the Code, objectively inter-
preted, carry a negative implication?" If so, what is it and does
section 402A intrude upon it? Even if there is no such implica-
tion, does section 402A clash directly with any of those
provisions?
In defense of section 402A, Wade develops several main
points. First, he delineates the common law differences between
tort and contract. Second, he disposes of the possibility that the
Code may have preempted the field of products liability based on
negligence. Third, he argues that the Code, being concerned with
sales contracts, is unscarred by a judicial thrust aimed only at
torts. Alternatively, he advances a more novel justification that
treats section 402A as creating a form of negligence per se, which,
being "negligence," is beyond the reach of the Code.
II. POSSIBILITIES OF CONFLICT
Before discussing the specifics of Wade's approach, let us
examine the possibilities of conflict between section 402A and the
Code. If the Code preempted anything by negative implication,
13. See generally R. DCKmlsON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUTES (1975).
14. The relevant provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code appear to
be: §§ 1-103, -201(11), 2-302, -314, -316, -318, -607(3)(a), -715(2)(b), and -719
(1972 version).
[Vol, 44
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what was its probable sweep? Possibility number one is that the
Uniform Commercial Code preempted the field of products liabil-
ity (other than liability based on culpability) but only with re-
spect to the legal relations between the immediate parties to the
sale in question. For courts willing to rely on comment 31h to
section 2-318, any uncertainty here has been dispelled regarding
vertical privity" and perhaps horizontal privity"7 (except possibly
with respect to employees of the retail buyer).S
Possibility number two is that the Code preempted the field
of products liability (other than liability based on culpability),
including the rights of third parties, so far as they rest on war-
ranty based on promise, but not so far as they rest on warranty
based on representation.
Possibility number three is that the Code preempted the
field of products liability (other than liability based on culpabil-
ity), including the rights of third parties so far as they rest on
warranty.
Possibility number four is that the Code preempted the field
of products liability (other than liability based on culpability),
including the rights of third parties, whether or not they rest on
warranty. This preemption would include all forms of strict liabil-
ity, including breach of warranty, liability under section 402A,
and some instances of negligence per se.
Stating the issue as one of "preemption," however, does not
exhaust the possibilities of conflict. Even if the Code preempted
nothing, there would still be the question whether in the circum-
15. The first alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries within
its provisions the family, household and guests of the purchaser. Be-
yond this, the section in this form is neutral and is not intended to
enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's war-
ranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the
distributive chain.
U.C.C. § 2-318 Alternative A, Comment 3 (1972 version).
16. Vertical privity is the relationship between two persons (e.g., a con-
sumer and the manufacturer) in the distribution chain.
17. Horizontal privity is the relationship between a consumer not in the
distribution chain (e.g., a member of the retail buyer's family) and the retailer.
18. In jurisdictions adopting Alternative A, beneficiaries under U.C.C. §
2-318 do not include the retail buyer's employees, only his family, household,
and guests.
19771
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stances the judicial activity under section 402A derogated from
any substantive right, privilege, or obligation that the Code was
designed to secure. If, for example, the Code allowed the seller to
disclaim in a situation not involving unconscionability, could the
court ignore the disclaimer by clothing the transaction in nonsta-
tutory terms? It hardly seems likely, since there is a strong pre-
sumption that a legislature intends to condition the coverage and
operation of its statutes on substantive considerations rather than
on mere names or form, or a system of jurisprudential pigeon-
holing. To assume otherwise is to assume that legislatures are
indifferent to easy evasion.
II. WADE'S PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS: CONTRACT V. TORT, AND
NEGLIGENCE
Before undertaking what few judges have tried, 9 Wade
19. Almost no judge has tried to defend the approach of section 402A
against the possibility of legislative preemption. Justice Traynor did not do so
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963), the purported spawning ground of "strict [products] liability
in tort." See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 803 (1966). It is clear that this distinguished judge be-
lieved that the Uniform Sales Act did not invade the field of third-party rights,
either affirmatively or by negative implication. Accordingly, he felt free to call
for a constructive filling of that area by the courts. But he produced not one word
of exegesis to support his tacit assumption that'the Act had left the area wholly
free for judicial development, an assumption that deference to the legislative
branch made it desirable to explicate. The social desirability of the result,
however great, was not enough to fill the legal gap.
Judge Holman's half-hearted effort in Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265
Ore. 259, 272-73, 509 P.2d 529, 535 (1973), hardly did the job with these three
defenses: (1) "[The legislature would not have intended to pre-empt the field
and thus to prevent the development of case law for the additional protection
of consumers . . . ." However, he offers no evidence of a legislative intent to
permit unlimited judicial innovations for consumer protection, even though the
Code's notice and disclaimer provisions suggest otherwise. (2) The Code, he
says, does not specifically adopt preemption. But what about preemption
through negative implication, which is neither specific nor express? (3) Because
every state that has adopted section 402A has also adopted the Code,
"[o]bviously, none of these courts thought the UCC pre-empted the field."
Although the statement is obviously true, there is no hard evidence that more
than a very few have ever given the matter serious attention.
Before Wade, the only academic to defend section 402A against protectors
of the Code was apparently Professor Littlefield. See Littlefield, Some Thoughts
[Vol. 44
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makes several preliminary observations. He attempts to distin-
guish contract from tort in terms of the interests that they pro-
tect:
Contract (sales) law protects the expectation interests of
the parties. It seeks to give them the benefit of their bargain
... .In sales of personal property, contract law is concerned
with the quality of the product, and it sets forth quality stan-
dards (merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose).
Tort (negligence) law, on the other hand, involves an obli-
gation imposed by law, not by contract. . . It does not depend
upon (require) a contractual arrangement . . . . It does not
purport to give the plaintiff the benefit of his bargain, but in-
stead undertakes to put him back in the position he was in
before his injury-to "make him whole." In sales of personal
property, tort law is concerned with the safety of the product.
It uses safety standards-for example, "unreasonably danger-
ous," "not duly safe."0
One difficulty is that in the context of products liability
Wade's differentiation is misleading: The differences are highly
exaggerated. The problem arises because, as he points out, "the
two theories sometimes overlap." 1 Unfortunately, the word
"sometimes" blurs the fact that almost all products liability as
we now know it lies in the area of overlap. Indeed, if we exclude
the negligence aspects of products liability, which create no prob-
lem in the present context, the significant aspects that remain lie
wholly within the common area. Within it, the courts have done
a skillful job of producing similar results, whichever theory has
been applied." To this extent, all or almost all the differences
on Products Liability Law: A Reply to Professor Shanker, 18 W. Rzs. L. REv.
10 (1966).
20. Wade, supra note 3, at 127.
21. Id. at 128.
22. See, e.g., Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Ore. 259, 266-67, 509 P.2d
529, 532-33 (1973). See also Seeley v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 29, 463 P.2d
145, 158, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 30 (1965), in which Justice Peters, dissenting in part
and concurring in part, stated:
[A1I1 the strict liability rule does to implied warranty law is abolish
the notice requirement, restrict the effectiveness of disclaimers to situ-
ations where it can be reasonably said that the consumer has freely
assumed the risk, and abolish the privity requirement, where ordinary
1977]
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
that Wade suggests disappear.
For example, in products liability cases "benefit of bargain"
is usually not at stake, leaving consequential damages (a tort-
flavored aspect of contract law) at the forefront. Despite some
marginal theoretical differences respecting foreseeability, the
courts have handled the consequential damages aspect of con-
tract law as if it were purely one of tort. 3 In any case, the interests
to be protected are identical-those of person or personal prop-
erty as threatened by civil wrong.
For the most part, Wade seems to agree. On the other hand,
he is on slippery ground when he says that, if the action is for
breach of a contractual obligation, recovery for consequential
damages "comes almost as an afterthought."24 However true this
may be of contract actions generally, it has almost nothing to
support it in the area of products liability as commonly under-
stood; consequential damage is what products liability is all
about. The fact that such damage is unusual elsewhere in actions
founded on breach of an obligation arising out of, or engrafted on,
contract does not take it out of "contract" or "sales" law.
The critical question is not whether smacking of tort makes
the matter smack any less of contract; it is whether smacking of
tort removes the matter from the scope of the relevant sales stat-
ute. Nobody seems to have publicly observed that neither the
extinct Uniform Sales Act nor the current Uniform Commercial
Code suggests that its applicability turns on whether the arrange-
ment or event involved is classified as "contract" or "tort." In-
stead, the Code's section 1-201(11) expressly forecloses the issue
by defining "contract" as encompassing "the total legal obliga-
tion which results from the parties' agreement as affected by this
Act and any other applicable rules of law."5 This is certainly
consumers are concerned. It does not introduce a notion of "defective"
which is different from that of "unmerchantable" in implied warranty
law.
See also Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be?,
42 IND. L.J. 301, 304-05 (1967).
23. See generally R. DICKERSON, PRODucTs LIABILITY AND THE FooD
CONSUMER § 5.2 (1951).
24. Wade, supra note 3, at 128.
25. U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (1972 version). This section should be read in con-
junction with section 1-103, which Wade says is of "comparatively little help"
because "the fields of law specifically referred to have to do primarily with
[Vol. 44
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broad enough to include the tort aspects of the transaction.
Wade next asks whether the Code preempted the negligence
aspects of products liability.6 Because no one has ever seriously
urged that it did, his contemplating the possibility seems close
to creating a straw man. Certainly, there is nothing surprising
about the Code's preempting some areas of sales law without
preempting all, whether or not they are also areas of tort law.
Answering Wade's question is not the problem. The main prob-
lems are (1) whether by negative implication the Code preempted
any part of the field of products liability and, if so, whether that
part is also claimed by section 402A, and (2) whether that section
is otherwise inconsistent with the Code.
IV. WADE'S RECONCILIATION NUMBER ONE: Two BREEDS OF CAT
After concluding his general ponderings, Wade confronts the
"real problem," which is "not the constitutionality of the negli-
gence action . . , but the constitutionality of section 402A and its
judicial following." 27 Protesting that his discussion of negligence
was no attempt to create a straw man, he draws a line between
"sales" law, which is statutory, and "negligence" ("tort"?) law,
which is common law. "The question is, on which side of the line
does strict liability fall?""
This strikes me as an odd way to pose the significant ques-
tion. The difference between sales law and negligence law is not
a useful basis of classification because the two categories do not
exhaust anything, and they do not exclude each other. If Wade
intends to suggest instead a useful distinction between "sales"
law and "tort" law (which from his later discussion appears to be
the case), I cannot imagine any gain from making such a division,
even if it could be successfully made. Although the Uniform Com-
mercial Code may be steeped in sales law and section 402A in
tort, nothing in that statement excludes the converse. In products
principles affecting the contract itself-its validity and enforceability." Wade,
supra note 3, at 130. But, read with section 1-201(11), it fortifies the impression
that the sweep of the Code, as indicated by the latter section, is very wide: "the
total legal obligation which results from the parties' agreement .... " U.C.C.
§ 1-201(11) (1972 version). This does not necessarily preempt negligence.
26. Wade, supra note 3, at 130-36.
27. Id. at 136.
28. Id.
19771
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liability cases, breach of warranty that results in injury has long
been viewed as tort,29 and section 402A is no less sales law than
section 2-314 of the Code. 0 There is thus an area of overlap, and
within it the distinction between section 402A and the Code with
respect to "sales" law and "tort" law is simply meaningless.
Wade says that "strict liability involves not just a change in
language but a change in meaning or theory."3 Whatever this
means specifically, it, means generally that the differences he
talks about are substantive rather than merely formal. Strict lia-
bility as a tort, he says, provides "a better . . . theory"3 to ex-
plain the decisions of the courts than breach of warranty as a tort.
Here, he appears to be comparing strict liability with something
else, but the something else is itself a kind of strict liability. The
resulting distinction, therefore, turns out to be between strict
liability in tort without the "warranty" label and strict liability
in tort with the "warranty" label.
He shifts distinctions once more. This time he apparently
contrasts strict-liability-as-expressed-in-section-402A with strict-
liability-as-expressed-in-sales-law.? Because section 402A, too, is
29. See, e.g., Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 103 (D. Hawaii 1961),
afj'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); La Hue v. Coca Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash.
2d 645, 647, 314 P.2d 421, 422 (1957); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps,
139 Tex. 609, 616, 164 S.W.2d 828, 831 (1942); Flessher v. Carstens Packing Co.,
93 Wash. 48, 55, 160 P. 14, 17 (1916). See also Prosser, supra note 19, at 801.
30. Uniform Commercial Code section 2-314(1) provides:
Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller
is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the
serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises
or elsewhere is a sale.
Here, as in section 402A of the Restatement, liability is expressly tied to sale.
31. Wade, supra note 3, at 137.
32. Id.
33. Id. The consumer law-commercial law distinction that has recently
surfaced in some of the cases has been supported, although not by Wade, on the
assumption that the Code itself, according to section 1-102 and the Code's very
name, is concerned only with "commercial" transactions. See, e.g., Heavner v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 152-55, 305 A.2d 412, 424-26 (1973).
But this approach carries the day only if "commercial" is limited to deals
between merchants, thus excluding deals between merchants and consumers.
The answer is found in the Code's own working provisions (e.g., §§ 2-314, -315).
Although they deal with sales between merchants, they deal also with sales at
retail, An attempt to exclude consumer transactions from the Code cannot be
[Vol, 44
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"sales law," Wade presumably means strict tort liability as em-
bodied in section 402A as distinguished from strict tort liability
as embodied in the Code's warranty law.
To support the allegedly substantive distinction, he contends
that the measure of quality in section 402A (freedom from any
unreasonably dangerous defect) differs materially from that in
the Code (merchantable quality), whereas the exact opposite is
true. The cases show that, despite the differences in wording and
despite the fact that section 402A speaks in terms of noncompli-
ance while the Code speaks in terms of compliance, the courts are
applying a uniform standard of defectiveness." The one respect
in which the two approaches sometimes differ lies in section
402A's requirement that the defective product be "unreasonably
dangerous," which has made a significant difference only occa-
sionally and which has recently been repudiated by several
courts.?
The upshot is that, whereas the differences in form may be
enormous, the differences in substance, if any, have been minus-
cule or nonexistent. What we are talking about here are not differ-
ences in general but differences within the area of products liabil-
ity not involving culpability.
The questionable aspects of Wade's analysis here are (1) the
apparent assumption that the tort-contract, tort-sales, tort-
warranty, 402A-Code, 402A-warranty, and common law-statute
distinctions are marked by the same boundary line, and (2) the
assumption that these distinctions, each of which may be signifi-
cant in analyzing social policy, are relevant to determining the
outer reaches of the Code. The error lies in trying to interpret the
Code within the area of products liability, not by explicating the
Code, but by evaluating its social impact in terms of a cluster of
preconceived, incongruent, and even inconsistent distinctions
that are treated as interchangeable (which they are not) and mu-
squared with its terms. Although the Heavner court limits its attempt to take
from the Code consumer protection against injuries to person or property, it
concedes that even to accomplish a limited removal involves assuming that the
Code did not mean what it explicitly said.
34. See note 23 supra.
35. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153,
104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d
562 (1973).
1977]
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tually exclusive (which they are not)."
Wade says that "[t]ort law provides the right milieu."" But
what does the milieu of tort law offer that is withheld by the
milieu of contract, especially when those categories so extensively
overlap in the area under consideration? That some aspects of
current statutory sales law are inadequately articulated to satisfy
modern notions of consumer protection is hardly warrant for ban-
ishing, as some courts have purported to do, the whole machinery
of "sales" law from the field of consumer protection." As for the
judicial leeway to balance interests that is said to inhere in the
tort approach, the opportunity to balance is no greater within the
concept of legal defect as it appears in section 402A than it is
under that concept as it inheres in the broader Code notion of lack
of "merchantability."
I suggest that forcing complicated statutory concepts into a
false, awkward, and, worse, irrelevant "dichotomy" between con-
tract and tort is a poor way of meeting the courts' general obliga-
tion to defer to legislative supremacy in the area of constitution-
ally valid policymaking. Even Wade has residual misgivings:
"With some courts . . . this analysis may not completely elimi-
nate all doubt as to whether the UCC has preempted section
402A." 3 On the basis of the analysis offered so far, I certainly
36. Much of the resulting confusion flows also from the fact that almost
all recent conceptualizing in this area presumes the inevitability of a two-valued
logic that says that all law is divided into "contract" and "tort." Such thinking
is not so wrong as it is unhelpful. Modern jurisprudence has arrived at a point
where at least a three-fold breakdown, while not "truer," would be preferable.
Would it not be more useful to distinguish (1) breaches of voluntary undertak-
ings, (2) deviations from standards of prudence, and (3) breaches of require-
ments that are to be met regardless of voluntary undertaking or lack of conven-
tional prudence? But, although more refined and more likely to be mutually
exclusive, even these categories would not necessarily be differentiated on bases
marking the outer reaches of the Code.
37. Wade, supra note 3, at 137.
38. Although the widely quoted comment, in Ketterer v. Armour & Co.,
200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912), that protection of the consumer's person and
property against defective goods ought not to depend on "the intricacies of the
law of sales" is commonly read as a wholesale rejection of "sales law" for this
purpose, I think the more plausible interpretation is to read it as a less drastic
rejection of the uncongenial complexities of the then current statutory sales law.
Such complexities can be singled out and dealt with, if necessary, by amending
the applicable sales statute.
39. Wade, supra note 3, at 138.
[Vol. 44
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hope not.
To bolster his claim of constitutionality, Wade offers this
additional insight: With the extension of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur and the natural prejudices of juries, the prevailing theory
of negligence has closely approached, in practical effect, results
attainable in strict liability. 0 (Any experienced trial lawyer will
tell you that, except for legal argumentation and formal instruc-
tions, he tries a case of negligent manufacture the same way that
he tries a case of strict liability; even the evidence is the same.)
Wade would seem to conclude that strict liability has become
negligence and thus lies beyond the reach of the Code. But it does
not follow that, because most or all negligence law has become
de facto strict liability, strict liability is now "negligence" law.
How can we extract a rule of law solely from a factual tenden-
cy? De facto is not automatically de jure, else this useful distinc-
tion would disappear. (We move here in the domain of law, not
almost-law.) Ironically, Wade's argument undermines rather
than supports his case. If the negligence in a purported "negli-
gence" action is fictional in the sense that there is no significant
effort to draw reasonable inferences of imprudence, the action
should be treated for what it is, an action in strict liability. If this
places it within the Code's area of preemption, the action should
be handled under the Code. It simply will not do to argue that,
because the Code steers around authentic negligence, it also
steers around pretended negligence. That would place form above
substance.
V. WADE'S REcONCILIATION NUMBER Two: NEGLIGENCE PER SE
Wade's alternative attempt to reconcile section 402A with
the Uniform Commercial Code relates to negligence per se, which
is normally negligence arising from breach of a criminal statute.
The gist of this approach is that, because the Code bypasses
negligence, it bypasses a kind of "negligence" that when exam-
ined depends in no way on culpability and therefore constitutes
strict liability."
Negligence per se normally involves breaching a statute that
40. Id.
41. Id.
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sets a standard of performance. 2 The courts in most states say
that failure to comply with such a statute is ipso facto
"negligence" regardless of culpability in the civil sense. 3 How-
ever, if the statute requires mens rea, as most criminal statutes
do, there is still criminal, if not civil, culpability. Here, negligence
per se retains some flavor of "negligence" in the broad culpability
sense. Moreover, the courts of some other states treat breach of
statute, including breach of a statute not requiring mens rea, only
as evidence of culpability." Here too we have negligence, not
strict liability.
It is only when we have a standard-setting statute, not re-
quiring mens rea in a state that views noncompliance as
"negligence" without further evidence of culpability, that we
have the full equivalent of strict liability comparable to that im-
posed by section 402A or section 2-314 of the Code. Because such
statutes are the rare exception, one wonders how Wade can multi-
ply such meager materials into a fund of loaves and fishes suffi-
cient to feed the legal needs of consumers everywhere. If ac-
cepted, Wade's argument proves that this kind of "negligence"
is in fact strict liability and therefore not negligence. And, if it is
not negligence, what basis is there for saying that the Code bypas-
ses it?
If there is to be civil liability arising out of breach of statute,
it must ordinarily be generated by the court. 5 This is so even
when the legislature has furnished the standard that the court
adopts. As always, the central question is: What does the statute
mean? On this basis, I accept his assumption that statutes that
expressly impose only criminal sanctions do not ordinarily impose
civil liability even by implication.
If a court can on its own initiative supplement a statutory
standard of criminality not requiring mens rea by imposing civil
consequences, it can achieve a similar result, says Wade, even
when such a statute does not exist." This it does by creating its
42. See Comment, Products Liability Based Upon Violation of Statutory
Standards, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1388, 1389-90, 1393 (1966). See also 2 F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.6, at 994-1014 (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 190-92 (4th ed. 1971).
43. See Comment, :iupra note 42, at 1393.
44. See id. at 1394.
45. Wade, supra note 3, at 139. See also Comment, supra note 42, at 1413.
46. Wade, supra note 3, at 139-40.
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own specific rule of conduct not involving culpability and then
substituting it for the general standard of due care. Specifically,
[sluppose . . . that the courts were to lay down, "once and for
all,'! a rule that it is negligence for a person who is engaged in
the business of selling a product to sell it on the market when it
is in an unreasonably dangerous condition. This would be a part
of the law of negligence and would in no way be impaired by the
provisions of the UCC, and yet it would amount to strict liabil-
ity. . . 47
[C]ases following 402A . . . are applying the principle of negli-
gence per se, with the court substituting for the usual standard
of negligence a specific rule of conduct .... 11
Let us examine the logic here. The Code bypasses negligence,
because the Code deals only with strict liability, whereas negli-
gence involves culpability. Negligence per se, which is in some
instances a kind of strict liability, is nonetheless "negligence."
Therefore the Code, in bypassing negligence, bypasses negligence
per se even in those instances in which it constitutes strict liabil-
ity. Section 402A likewise escapes the clutches of the Code, be-
cause it too is only a form of negligence per se and therefore
negligence. 9 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.H is simi-
larly rationalized. 5
Wade finds precedent for this approach in Dippel v. Sciano.2
Although the plaintiff had pleaded breach of implied warranty
under section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court, eager to apply its new doctrine of comparative neg-
ligence, treated the claim initially as a breach of section 402A.
The court then rationalized the strict liability that it imposed as
"negligence per se," even though no violation of a criminal stat-
ute was involved. By this approach the court purported to bypass
both the Uniform Sales Act and section 402A by relying on sec-
tion 402A to get around the Act and then by extending
"negligence per se" to get around section 402A.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 142.
49. Id. at 140.
50. See note 19 supra.
51. Wade, supra note 3, at 141.
52. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
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But does even this rationale support Wade's position? In
Dippel, the doctrine of negligence per se was extended only to
provide cover for derogating from Restatement doctrine, which
the Wisconsin court had no constitutional duty to honor. The
Uniform Commercial Code was not eroded because it was not yet
in force and because, being a vertical privity case, the situation
fit neatly into the niche marked by comment 3 to section 2-318.11
Whether the Uniform Sales Act was eroded depends on whether
we reject the rationale of the tiny group of cases, such as
Chapman v. Brown,4 that had seriously investigated and dis-
missed the possibility of legislative preemption. In any event, the
Wisconsin court did not offer its negligence per se approach to
reconcile its action with anything other than section 402A; com-
patibility with the Uniform Sales Act it simply took for granted.
Thus, the main constitutional gap was not convincingly plugged.
Wade's fallacy lies at the point where he, like the Wisconsin
court, assumes that negligence per se, which is often negligence
in fact and sometimes negligence only in law, is always
"negligence." Can a court, by judicial fiat, effectively decree that
what is in effect strict liability is "negligence" without butchering
accepted usage? As long as the gist of negligence is culpability in
fact, there is no way, except in some Orwellian sense, that strict
liability, which does riot involve culpability, can be negligence.
Wade has apparently fallen into the verbal trap unintention-
ally laid by Ehrenzweig, whose recognition of "negligence without
fault" as a risk distribution device amounting to strict liability
might suggest that he classifies such liability as "negligence.'' 5
On the other hand, Ehrenzweig is careful to enclose the word
"negligence" in quotation marks when using it to denote strict
liability masquerading as negligence, thus making clear that in
his judgment usage still identifies negligence with culpability.56
53. This states that section 2-318, Alternative A, extending warranties to
specified third parties, "is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the
developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who
resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain." U.C.C. § 2-318, Com-
ment 3. See also U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 2 (1972 version).
54. 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aft'd, 304 F.2d 149 (1962).
55. A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951).
56. For traditional negligence, Ehrenzweig prefers the term "negligent
causation." Id. at 36. See also James, Statutory Standards and Negligence in
Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. REv. 95 (1950).
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In any event, "negligence without fault" and "negligence per se"
are not necessarily kinds of negligence in the normal culpability
sense any more than root beer is necessarily a kind of beer. How
then can Wade assume otherwise? The distinction between fault
and strict accountability still needs preserving, and confining the
simple term "negligence" to fault is a good way of doing it,
One apparently plausible answer to this with respect to negli-
gence per se is that some types of conduct are so bad that they
constitute imprudence in all situations. Although the incidence
of this type of situation may be uncertain, 7 there is no question-
ing the possibility. In such cases, a statutory or other prohibition
merely coincides with an institutional finding of fact. When this
is so, we have negligence in the classical sense of actual culpabil-
ity, which is no less actual because it is coextensive with a rule
of law. Here, negligence per se is "negligence" in the full civil
sense. But does this happen often enough to support an across-
the-board products liability rationale? The hard fact is that much
of negligence per se is merely evidence of civil culpability, the
great bulk of it rests on criminal culpability, and only a small
percentage of it constitutes strict liability of the kind imposed by
the Restatement and the Code. The distinction between the culp-
able and the nonculpable is too useful to be brushed aside by an
assertion that strict liability can be classed as "negligence."
This latter point is not refuted by the fact that, as currently
applied by many courts (even under section 402A), "strict liabil-
ity" is being relaxed in the case of unforeseeable side effects to
the point where it is contingent on what is arguably a mild form
of culpability."8 Even in this limited area, what we call
"negligence" and "strict liability" are still separated by impor-
tant degrees of culpability. Wade's argument holds up only if the
courts can by fiat eliminate a distinction that, wherever it is most
logical to draw it, is vital to marking the outer boundaries of a
finite code. And this brings us back once more to the crucial
question: What does the Code mean?
57. "lIlt is unrealistic and mechanical to say that reasonable men would
blindly obey all the regulatory statutes under all circumstances, and to deprive
the jury of its usual and historic function in negligence cases .... James,
supra note 56, at 108.
58. See Dickerson, supra note 9, at 456. See also Dickerson, supra note 22,
at 322-28.
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Outside the limited area just discussed, what basis is there
for imputing negligence-in-fact to every person who happens to
sell a defective product? Wade may believe that merely selling an
"unreasonably dangerous" product, however accidentally, war-
rants stigmatizing the seller along with his product, his
"negligence" having consisted of opting to be in that kind of
business.59 Under current tests of legal defectiveness, however,
unreasonable danger in a product, as viewed from the standpoint
of the consumer, does not necessarily include any factor from
which unreasonableness can be imputed to the seller. Responsi-
bility is not ipso facto culpability. If this is not sufficiently clear
in the case of the manufacturer, it should be in the case of the
retailer.
The theme implied in Wade's defense of section 402A's con-
stitutionality is that form controls substance. What's in a name?
If we call something "negligence per se" it is automatically ex-
cluded from a statute that bypasses "negligence" (even when the
negligence per se amounts to strict liability), but if we call it
"breach of warranty" it is automatically included! But if
"warranty," as alleged fiction, is abhorrent to strict tort liability,
is not "negligence," as fiction, equally so? If name juggling is all
that it takes to thwart a socially uncongenial statute, the consti-
tutional principle of legislative supremacy is in a bad way.
So far this analysis has assumed that "negligence," una-
dorned with the words "per se" is confined to culpability. But
suppose, for the purposes of argument, that the normal meaning
59, Compare this statement: "Putting out a defective and dangerous prod-
uct ... involves a measure of fault ... even though there is no negligence."
Wade, A Uniform Comparative Fault Act-What Should it Provide?, 10 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 220, 226 (1977). Here Wade relies on a concept of no-negligence
fault, whereas in his earlier article he seems to rely on a concept of no-fault
negligence. Under which shell will we find the pea? If it is under "negligence,"
Wade's latest approach cuts him off from enjoying the fruits of classifying the
strict liability aspect of negligence per se as "negligence." If it is under "fault,"
he will have to convert the doctrine of negligence per se to a doctrine of fault
per se, and then explain to the reader how the two concepts differ. But even if
he accomplishes this, he will still have to face up to the fact that the elements
that constitute "fault" under section 402A exist to the same precise extent in
bodily injury cases resulting from breaches of the Code's warranty off merchant-
ability, a fact that he affirms in this later article. Id. at 227. Finally, he must
answer the question: How can the Code fail to apply to something that is sub-
stantively indistinguishable from what it unquestionably covers?
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of "negligence" also includes the kind of strict liability that is
involved in some instances in "negligence per se." If so, it would
seem prudent to review our earlier conclusion that the Code steers
around "negligence" to determine whether we should have con-
cluded that it steers around only culpability, If we should then
decide that the Code bypasses all types of "negligence," including
all types of negligence per se, it would seem equally prudent to
ponder how far a court may appropriately go in extending the
concept of "negligence per se." Although concepts are capable of
judicial growth, what happens when a judicially created concept
grows to the point where it envelops a concept already locked into
a statute? Does the legislature lose control of it? This is now
happening with section 402A. That the courts control the inter-
pretative process does not absolve them from the constitutional
obligation to respect legislative supremacy. Although this does
not shut off judicial growth, it involves respecting the general
legislative connotations existing at the time of enactment.
If Wade's approach is sound, may we not take the last logical
step? Courts imposing strict tort liability in warranty on the basis
of the statutory quality standard of merchantability laid down in
the Code are, by the standard urged, applying "negligence per
se." Because negligence per se is "negligence" and the Code by-
passes negligence, the Code bypasses strict liability for breach of
the warranty of merchantability. Consequently, the Code does
not occupy even the field that it expressly covers. Here, indeed,
is a jurisprudential landmark!
Although Wade would hardly allow himself to be led into
such a reductio ad absurdum, 0 notice how far he is willing to go:
A court may borrow a safety rule from a statute, label noncompli-
ance with it "negligence per se," and apply the new rule to situa-
60. Or would he? If applying section 402A is applying negligence per se,
and if borrowing the Uniform Sales Act's quality standards in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Product., Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963),
to impose strict liability in a situation presumed not to be covered by that act
was negligence per se, why would not applying the Uniform Commercial Code's
quality standards in a strict liability suit in a retail situation obviously covered
by it likewise be negligence per se?
On the other hand, the fact that the Code obviously applies to what it
expressly deals with makes certain that, if Wade has appropriately character-
ized such strict liability as "negligence per se," he has effectively demonstrated
that, far from bypassing negligence per se, the Code embraces and controls it.
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tions covered by the statute. But the result of applying it is at
least potentially at variance with the rule that the statute applies
to the identical situation, with the result that the latter becomes
a practical nullity. This is precisely what the court in Dippel did
to section 402A."
Although a scholar of Wade's intellectual integrity could
hardly be charged with premeditated word juggling, I suggest
that, under strict academic accountability, he may have commit-
ted the logical misdemeanor that Ogden and Richards have called
"utraquistic subterfuge." 2 This is using in the same context the
same word, "negligence," in two different senses-the one exclud-
ing strict liability, the other including it-a verbal crime that has
wreaked untold intellectual havoc.
I am reminded of Belvedere, one of M.C. Escher's "im-
possible" buildings, in which the first floor is functionally re-
lated to the connecting structure if the structure is viewed as
having a particular aspect, whereas the second floor is function-
ally related to the same structure only if the structure is viewed
as not having that aspect. In Wade's analysis, the connecting
structure is "negligence per se," which is functionally related to
negligence only when it is based on culpability and functionally
related to strict liability only when it is not.
Is this a sound way to build otherwise desirable new law?
VI. SUMMARY
Dean Wade's constitutional apology for section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts rests, inter alia, on the following
assumptions:
(1) Tort and contract are mutually exclusive.
(2) Whether an action is framed in tort or in contract is rele-
vant to determining whether the Uniform Commercial Code
applies.
(3) The measure of legal defectiveness under section 402A dif-
fers materially from that under the Code.
(4) Negligence per se is always negligence and is therefore by-
passed by the Code.
Because these assumptions appear to be false, I conclude that
Wade has not established the constitutionality of section 402A.
61. See note 52 supra.
62. C. OGDEN & I. RiCHARDS, THF MEANING OF MFANING 134 (10th ed. 1956).
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